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Abstract
The study presented in this article investigated to what extent bank customers understand the
terms and conditions (T&Cs) they have signed up to. If many customers are not able to understand
T&Cs and the behaviours they are expected to comply with, they risk not being compensated when
their accounts are breached. An expert analysis of 30 bank contracts across 25 countries found that
most contract terms were too vague for customers to infer required behaviour. In some cases the
rules vary for different products, meaning the advice can be contradictory at worst. While many
banks allow customers to write Personal identification numbers (PINs) down (as long as they are
disguised and not kept with the card), 20% of banks categorically forbid writing PINs down, and a
handful stipulate that the customer have a unique PIN for each account. We tested our findings in a
survey with 151 participants in Germany, the USA and UK. They mostly agree: only 35% fully
understand the T&Cs, and 28% find important sections are unclear. There are strong regional vari-
ations: Germans found their T&Cs particularly hard to understand, and USA bank customers
assumed some of their behaviours contravened the T&Cs, but were reassured when they actually
read them.
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Introduction
The ability to revoke fraudulent bank payments, or at least reim-
burse the victims of fraud, is one of the main selling points of the
consumer banking system and particularly payment cards. The add-
itional security feature is also used to justify the higher transaction
fees associated with card payments, compared with payment sys-
tems where transactions are final, such as cash and cryptocurrencies.
However, whether a customer who becomes a victim of fraud actu-
ally is reimbursed depends on the contract between the bank and its
customers (which may in turn depend on national or international
legislation), and how a bank chooses to apply the Terms &
Conditions (T&Cs) the customer has signed up to. In order to be
reimbursed, a fraud victim may need to demonstrate that they have
followed security practices set out in the T&Cs—and thus it is very
important that customers (i) are able to understand them, and (ii)
are able to comply with the behaviours stipulated in them.
This article builds on previous research into the fairness of bank
T&Cs, particularly how the rules adapt to changes in technology.
The first study, by Bohm, Brown and Gladman [1], reviewed the
T&Cs of online banking services, which at the time were still in
their infancy. They found that some bank contracts stipulated that a
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customer accepting an online banking password also accepted liabil-
ity for any transactions that the bank claimed were made with that
password, regardless of whether the customer had actually made
them. Bohm et al. pointed out that the liability had shifted; a forged
handwritten signature is null and void in most countries, so a bank
cannot make customers liable for forged cheques using its T&Cs.
The banks took advantage of the technology change to escape 19th-
century consumer protection law. In some countries, such as the
USA, pressure by consumer-rights advocates led to regulations that
require disputed transactions to be refunded.
Recent research [2] also found bank T&Cs did not have suffi-
cient detail for customers to work out what they had to do to be
compliant, and in some cases were contradictory. The same study
also found that bank customers do not comply with conditions on
Personal identification number (PIN) security: they regularly share,
reuse, and write down PINs—because they are unable to manage the
credentials otherwise. Adapting the concept of a ‘security budget’
from Beautement, Sasse and Wonham [3], the cost of compliance
(such as the cognitive effort required to remember PINs, the embar-
rassment of being unable to complete transactions, and the inability
to get relatives to run errands) with T&Cs may be so high that mil-
lions of customers act habitually in ways that break them because
they simply could not manage otherwise.
There is also the issue of affordances; banks permit customers to
change PINs ‘so you can pick one that is memorable to you’. For in-
frequently-used accounts, however, customers will often change
them to the PIN on the most frequently-used account, because they
are afraid they will forget it, and consider re-using a PIN more se-
cure than writing it down. Many T&Cs, however, stipulate that the
PIN for the account must be unique. It is technically straightforward
for a bank to set a random PIN on every card issued to a customer,
and not let them change it. By letting customers change PINs, but
forbidding changes most customers will make in order to cope with
the small print, the banks are inducing their customers to break the
rules—and thus create ground for not being reimbursed in case of a
breach. At the regulatory level, there is a tension between direct
consumer protection (which might limit PIN change facilities), and
the promotion of competition (for which PIN changes are a good
thing, otherwise people will be less likely to start using different
cards). But to what extent are there inconsistencies between banks
in a country (that may lead to confusion), what do customers
understand of their obligations, and whether such issues are hidden
from the public behind the obscure contract language? This research
attempts to find out.
In the ‘Review of banking T&Cs internationally’ of this research,
we first conduct an expert examination of bank T&Cs around the
world, identifying consistency, or lack thereof, both within and be-
tween countries. We draw on our diverse research team to sample
the major banks and translate relevant passages into English. We
focus on security advice on PINs, bank statements and telephone
and online banking.
In the second part of this article we conduct a cross-cultural study
between 151 individuals in the USA, UK and Germany. We ask par-
ticipants if the rules are sufficiently clear, and if they understand the
obligation imposed on customers by the banks’ T&Cs. We focus this
study on two common cases of bank fraud and supply the participants
with the relevant sections of bank T&Cs from their country.
We conclude in the section ‘Discussion’ that if banking rules
similarly cannot be understood, then it is unreasonable to expect
customers to comply with them. Indeed, they make matters worse:
Adams and Sasse [4] demonstrated a long time ago that traditional
password and PIN policies require humanly impossible memory
tasks. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology
report [5] found that in a work context, over 50% of staff write
their credentials down in some way. As disputes are often centered
around the PIN being written down and kept with the card—with
the customer saying they did not do this, and the bank saying that
they must have done—we argue that stipulating a behaviour that we
know most people cannot follow means the rules are out of date at
best, and unfair at worst. Finally, if the liability shifts to the cus-
tomer, banks face a less than socially optimal incentive to detect and
prevent fraudulent activity on their systems.
Related literature
Financial fraud remains an area of concern. In the UK, payment
card fraud increased by 6% to £618 million in 2016 [6]. In the USA
about 2 million customers actively reported fraud in 2012 [7], and
while it is difficult to accurately specify in the USA, Sullivan
estimates the value of unauthorized third-party fraud transactions
through debit and credit card transactions as $3.8 billion for 2012
[8]. While the direct monetary loss to customers is negligible in the
USA thanks to strong consumer protection, major data breaches
have further repercussions as more personal identifiable information
is stolen because fraudsters use this very data to attack customer
accounts. Sullivan also compares the loss due to fraud between
(amongst others) the USA, UK and the Single Euro Payment Area
(SEPA) [8, Chart 9]: On a per-transaction basis over the period of
2005–2012, SEPA had the lowest fraud loss, followed by the UK
and the USA.
Despite the significant volume of payment fraud, research on
understanding its implications is surprisingly limited. In the USA,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia regularly runs its own con-
ference series on ‘Consumer Credit & Payments’ and the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City one on ‘Payments’. Stanley discusses
work by Hogarth and Hilgert (primary text unavailable) where 18%
of households had complaints with their credit card provider, but
fraud is not mentioned [9]. The focus of the article instead lies on
maintaining a safe environment: improving banks’ risk mitigation
techniques, increased cooperation between banks and payment
reversal—attempting to shift liability of consumers is ‘not good
politics’. Despite discussing the impact of consumer regulation in
financial markets, most of the discussion focusses on the impact of
disclosures. On the topic of credit cards, fraud is not considered to
be an important regulatory aspect, compared to regulation limiting
the creditors ability to change interest rates at short notice and levy
fines, as banks stand to lose a large revenue stream. The report notes
that customer complaint data (from the CFPB) relatively closely
reflects overall consumer satisfaction with financial institutions. The
conference also debated consumers’ ability to understand financial
disclosures. It concludes that consumers cannot be expected to read
disclosures, but if a consumer is interested they should be easily ac-
cessible and comprehensible. The participants agree that further aca-
demic research on the understanding and comprehension of
disclosures should be conducted—as indeed we do in this research.
When Sullivan considers payment fraud in the USA, his recommen-
dations for reducing payment fraud are mostly technical [8]. In the
short term the industry should focus on hardening systems to attack,
followed by improving the security of payment cards themselves in the
medium term. Only in the long term does he call for standardization
of payment systems (and their security). Further he argues that the
existing basic tort-law principle ‘that the entity in the best position to
deter check fraud will bear the losses for a check it processes’ should
be expanded to the rest of the payment industry as well.
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This is in stark contrast with legislation in the UK and the
European Union. Before the introduction of payment cards,
consumer protection in the UK was comparable to the USA as
consumers were not liable for forged signatures on cheques. This
liability was reduced slightly with the introduction of payment
cards, where the consumer was liable for the first £50 (or there-
abouts, depending on the bank) of fraud [1].
The introduction of automated teller machines (ATMs) caused
a significant shift in consumer liability, as the bank would claim a
customer was negligent or collusive if their card and PIN appeared
to have been used. This was sharpened with the move to Chip and
PIN as chip cards are harder to forge [10], and by the Payment
Services Directive which supported harmonisation of regulations
across the EU for members of the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA).
Suddenly if the bank deems that a consumer has been negligent in
handling their PIN the consumer is fully liable. This change in cus-
tomer liability has caused banks to become careless and therefore
caused a huge increase in fraud in the UK [11], as consumers are un-
able to fix the banks’ numerous security issues [12, 10].
Yet academic study of the reasons and consequences of this shift
in liability is limited. In a rare publication on payment fraud from
the field of criminology, Jansen and Leukfeld apply Routine Activity
and Protection Motivation theory in a study with 30 phishing and
malware victims [13]. They find that to some degree everyone is sus-
ceptible to online banking fraud victimization, regardless of their
knowledge and skill. They identify that victims had taken adequate
steps to protect themselves yet recommend more safety training for
customers as well as education about the fraud risks. However, if
the risks apply to all customers who find that protecting themselves
is difficult, it makes more economic sense to allocate the risks to the
actor who can do most to reduce the fraud overall, and who can
also implement a straightforward procedure for recovering the funds
[10, 11 and 14].
Review of banking T&Cs internationally
Methodology
In the first stage of this project, we surveyed the T&Cs of 30 banks
operating in 25 countries. The study’s scope included Europe
(Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, and the UK),
the USA, Africa (Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), the
Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen), and East
Asia (Singapore). Also included in the analysis is the Code of
Consumer Banking Practice for Singapore. No banks were found
operating online in Libya or Syria. We selected these banks in order
to get a good representation across different cultures and regions.
There was some convenience sampling in the countries selected,
according to the language skills available within the research team. The
bank documents included in this survey, and the codes used to identify
them, are outlined in Table 1. For example, for APS Bank in Malta
there were two relevant documents—APS1 and APS2. For other banks
three or more documents contained relevant information.
Major banks were selected for the study. These are not always
the largest banks, as some make their T&Cs available only to ac-
count holders. In some cases, multiple documents were reviewed, as
some banks had separate T&Cs for telephone and Internet banking,
as well as credit cards, debit cards and current accounts. All the
documents reviewed were downloaded from the banks’ websites
and were for personal (rather than business) accounts. We found
that T&Cs for accounts that adhere to Sharia Law, which prohibits
charging interest on loans or paying it on savings, had identical se-
curity clauses to other personal accounts at the same bank. There
were no further differences found for other types of personal ac-
count customers, such as high-wealth individuals.
The T&Cs were reviewed to identify instructions of or advice on
security. This included how users should handle the PINs associated
with their cards, as well as credentials for telephone and Internet bank-
ing. The documents reviewed were in English, German, Italian, Arabic,
and Greek. The authors include native speakers of these languages,
who translated the relevant sections and coded them in accordance
with the categories set out in Table 2. To ensure consistency, we de-
veloped written instructions outlining how to select banks for review,
which types of document to access, and the types of data to extract
(and translate) from the T&Cs, as set out in the coding categories.
Results
The T&Cs relating to PIN, telephone banking and Internet banking
are considered in turn. A summary of the findings relating specific-
ally to customer obligations to secure PINs is shown in Table 3.
PIN write clauses
It is very common for banks’ terms of service to provide guidelines
to their customers on writing down their PIN—26 banks out of 30
have them. The most common instruction is to keep the written PIN
in a different place from the card, and not to write it on the card
itself—15 banks have such a requirement. Only six banks forbid
their users from writing the PIN down anywhere. Vague statements
are not uncommon: five banks instruct the customer to keep the PIN
in a ‘safe’ place. These banks include Ahli United Bank (AUB1),
Bank Audi (BAL1), Bank of Baghdad (BBI1), Nedbank (NSA1) and
Zenith Bank (ZBN1). Furthermore, three banks (Arab Banking
Corp. (ABC2), HSBC (HUK2), and National Bank of Kenya
(NBKe1)) allow PINs to be written down in an ‘obfuscated’ fashion
that others cannot easily reconstruct. In contrast, National Bank of
Greece explicitly states that ‘the Bearer is required to: memorize the
PIN, not write it down – even in an obscured fashion – on the Card
or on any other document . . . ’ (NBG1).
There is considerable variation in how PINs may be written down,
and where. For example, Arab Banking Corp. in Algeria, HSBC in the
UK, and National Bank of Kenya stipulate the following:
Never writing the Customer’s password or security details down
in a way that someone else could easily understand, or allowing
anyone to observe the Customer inputting the Customer’s pass-
word details on any electronic media (ABC2).
Never writing down or otherwise recording your PINs and other
security details in a way that can be understood by someone
else . . . (HUK1).
If the Customer makes a written record of any PIN Code or se-
curity procedure, the Customer must make reasonable effort to
disguise it and must not keep it with the card for which it is to be
used (NBKe1).
It is not specified whether it is the PIN that should not be under-
stood by someone else (such as by using a code to disguise the num-
bers), or whether it is the connection between the PIN and the card
that should not be understood.
A number of other banks are similarly vague about proximity of
PIN and card. Here are more examples from Nedbank in South
Africa, and Zenith Bank in Nigeria:
The client must . . . ensure that any record of the PIN is kept sep-
arate from the card and in a safe place (NSA2).
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The customer . . . undertakes . . . not to write down the Passcode,
Accesscode/Password in an open place to avoid third party com-
ing across . . . (ZBN1). . . .
Bank Audi (BAL1), Bank of Baghdad in Iraq (BBI1), Bank of
Cyprus (BCC1), Deutsche Bank (DBG1), Sparkassen and Volksbank
in Germany (DSG1, DVR2), and UniCredit in Italy (UIt1) state that
the PIN should not be stored with or on the payment card.
Moreover, Bank of Cyprus (BCC1) states that the PIN should not be
recorded or stored on an electronic device that allows it to be identi-
fied with the card.
Qatar National Bank provides vague advice (QNB1): it requests
its customers to only memorize their PINs. On the other hand, a
Table 1. Banking documents included in survey
Bank Country Document name Reference Access date
Ahli United Bank Bahrain Security Information AUB1 1 September 2015
APS Bank Malta APS 365 Online Service—T&Cs Agreement—Personal Customers APS1 1 September 2015
APS Bank Malta Cards—T&Cs APS2 1 September 2015
Arab Bank Jordan Privacy Statement ABJ1 2 September 2015
Arab Bank Jordan Ways to Bank—ATM—Security Tips ABJ2 2 September 2015
Arab Bank Jordan Ways to Bank—Internet Banking Services (Arabi Online) T&Cs ABJ3 2 September 2015
Arab Bank Yemen Ways to Bank—ATM—Security Tips ABY1 2 September 2015
Arab Bank Yemen Ways to Bank—Internet Banking Service—T&Cs ABY2 2 September 2015
Arab Banking Corp. Algeria Online Security ABC1 1 September 2015
Arab Banking Corp. Algeria T&Cs ABC2 1 September 2015
Association of Banks Singapore Code of Consumer Banking Practice ABS1 1 September 2015
Association of Banks Singapore Code of Practice for Banks—Credit Cards ABS2 1 September 2015
Bank Audi Lebanon Privacy and Security—Information Security Tips BAL1 3 September 2015
Bank Muscat Oman Cards—Good Practices (Card Usage) BMO1 3 September 2015
Bank Muscat Oman Internet Banking—Security BMO2 3 September 2015
Bank of Baghdad Iraq Electronic Services—Visa Card Service BB1 1 September 2015
Bank of Cyprus Cyprus Cards T&Cs BCC1 7 September 2015
Bank of Palestine Palestine T&Cs BPP1 3 September 2015
Citibank USA Client Manual Consumer Accounts CUS1 1 September 2015
Co-operative Central Bank Cyprus Bank Card Agreement CCB1 7 September 2015
Commercial International Bank Egypt Online Security CIB1 1 September 2015
Dachverband der Volksbanken
und Raiffeisenbanken
Germany Sonderbedingungen fu¨r das Online-Banking DVR1 18 September 2015
Dachverband der Volksbanken
und Raiffeisenbanken
Germany Sonderbedingungen fu¨r die VR-BankCard DVR2 18 September 2015
Danske Bank Denmark Conditions Cheque and Cash Card Accounts DBD1 1 September 2015
Danske Bank Denmark T&Cs for Access Agreement - Danske eBanking Consumers DBD2 1 September 2015
Deutsche Bank Privat- und
Geschaeftskunden AG
Germany Bedingungen fu¨r Debitkarten DBG1 6 September 2015
Deutsche Bank Privat- und
Geschaeftskunden AG
Germany Bedingungen fu¨r den Zugang zur Deutsche Bank
AG u¨ber elektronische Medien
DBG2 6 September 2015
Deutscher Sparkassenverlag Germany Allgemeine Gescha¨ftsbedingungen DSG1 4 September 2015
Deutscher Sparkassenverlag Germany Bedingungen fu¨r das Online-Banking DSG2 4 September 2015
HSBC UK Banking Made Easy HUK1 1 March 2016
HSBC UK Current Accounts and Savings Accounts T&Cs HUK2 1 September 2015
HSBC UK Personal Interest Banking T&Cs HUK3 1 September 2015
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy T&Cs for ‘Mondo Carta’—Electronic Debit Card MPS1 7 September 2015
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy T&Cs for ‘Multicanalita Integrata’—Internet and Phone Banking MPS2 7 September 2015
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE General T&Cs NBA1 3 September 2015
National Bank of Greece Greece Unified Booklet of Terms for Deposits by Individuals NBG1 7 September 2015
National Bank of Kenya Kenya T&Cs Credit Cards NBKe1 1 September 2015
National Bank of Kenya Kenya T&Cs Personal Account Openings NBKe2 1 September 2015
National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait ATM Safety Tips NBKu1 2 September 2015
National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait Support—Security—Card Security Tips NBKu2 2 September 2015
National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait Support—Security—Online Safety Tips—Prevention Checklist NBKu3 2 September 2015
National Commercial Bank Saudi Arabia Consumer Protection Code NCB1 3 September 2015
National Commercial Bank Saudi Arabia Personal Banking—AlAhli Online—Security Awareness Tips NCB2 3 September 2015
Nedbank South Africa e-Banking Service T&Cs NSA1 1 September 2015
Nedbank South Africa T&Cs of Transactional Current Accounts NSA2 1 September 2015
OCBC Singapore Online Banking Security OSi1 1 September 2015
OCBC Singapore T&Cs—Electronic Banking Services OSi2 1 September 2015
Qatar National Bank Qatar Personal Banking—Credit Cards—Credit Card Safety QNB1 3 September 2015
Unicredit Italy Terms of Service—Carte di Debito Internatzionali
A Doppia Tecnologica—Debit Cards
UIt1 10 September 2015
Zenith Bank Nigeria e-Banking Service T&Cs ZBN1 1 September 2015
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number of banks, including Ahli United Bank in Bahrain (AUB1),
Citibank in the USA (CUS1) and National Commercial Bank in
Saudi Arabia (NCB2), provide more specific advice. The following
appeared under the heading ‘Security Tips’ of Citibank, so is per-
haps not binding:
Keep your Personal Identification Number (PIN), Telephone
Personal Identification Code (TPIC) and other codes used to ac-
cess your accounts secret. Do not tell them to anyone. Do not
write them on your Citibank Banking Card or keep them in your
wallet or purse . . . CUS1.
The advice from the National Bank of Kenya differs by the type
of account. For credit cards, there is only a requirement to keep the
PIN secret:
The Card member shall exercise due care to ensure the safety of
the Card and the Secrecy of the PIN at all times . . . (NBKe1).
In contrast, the following requirements are set out for current
accounts:
If the Customer makes a written record of any PIN Code or se-
curity procedure, the Customer must make reasonable effort to
disguise it and must not keep it with the card for which it is to be
used . . . (NBKe2).
Arab Bank in Jordan and Yemen (ABJ2, ABY1), Bank Muscat in
Oman (BMO1), APS Bank in Malta (APS2), Co-operative Central Bank
of Cyprus (BCC1), National Bank of Greece (NBG1), and National Bank
of Kuwait (NBKu2) forbid customers from writing down the PIN any-
where at all. For example, the following is from APS Bank:
Not writing down the PIN on the Card or anywhere, or disclos-
ing it to anyone else including the Police officers and/or the
Bank’s personnel . . . (APS2).
Danske Bank in Denmark does not allow the PIN to be kept with the
card. It does offer ‘PIN memorisers’ for recording obfuscated PINs:
Do not keep your PIN with your card or write it on your card.
For security reasons, you should memorise your PIN. If you are
unable to do so, keep it in a safe place, preferably a PIN memor-
iser. PIN memorisers are available free of charge from any of our
branches . . . (DBD1).
In Singapore, OCBC does not appear to specify how customers
might record PINs (OSi2), even though its trade association has a
Table 2. Description of coding categories used
Category Description
PINWrite References to writing down PINs
PINChange References to changing PINs
PINReuse References to reusing PINs, whether it be within the same or across different banks
PINAdvice What to do with the written letter from the bank that contains the PIN
ReceiptsStatements What to do with the receipts and statements
TelephoneWrite References to writing down telephone banking access codes
TelephoneChange References to reusing telephone banking access codes, whether it be within the same or across different banks
TelephoneAdvice What to do with the written advice from the bank that contains the telephone banking access code
OnlineWrite References to writing down online banking access codes
OnlineChange References to changing online banking access codes
OnlineReuse References to reusing online banking access codes, whether it be within the same or across different banks
OnlineAdvice What to do with the written advice from the bank that contains the online banking access code
OnlineSecuritySoftware Requirements to install and keep up to date security software
OnlineNetwork Use of the network that the customer can access online banking from, including public access points
OnlinePassword Requirements relating to the use of password managers or saving passwords in the browser
OnlineDevice Requirements relating to the type or status of devices (e.g., not shared/public access, jailbroken/rooted)
Table 3. Summary of banks’ T&Cs related to PIN security
Bank (country) W C R A Bank (country) W C R A
HSBC (United Kingdom)     The Association of Banks (Singapore)    
OCBC (Singapore)     Nedbank (South Africa)    
Zenith Bank (Nigeria)     National Bank of Kenya (Kenya)    
APS Bank Limited (Malta)     Danske Bank (Denmark)    
Monte dei Paschi (Italy)     Unicredit (Italy)    
Sparkassen (Germany)     Deutsche Bank (Germany)    
Volksbank (Germany)     Citibank (United States)    
Ahli United Bank (Bahrain)     Commercial International Bank (Egypt)    
Bank of Baghdad (Iraq)     Arab Bank (Jordan)    
National Bank of Kuwait (Kuwait)     Arab Banking Corp. (Algeria)    
Bank Audi (Lebanon)     Bank Muscat (Oman)    
Bank of Palestine (Palestine)     Qatar National Bank (Qatar)    
National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia)     National Bank of Abu Dhabi (UAE)    
Arab Bank (Yemen)     National Bank of Greece (Greece)    
Co-operative Central Bank (Cyprus)     Bank of Cyprus (Cyprus)    
‘W’ indicates clauses related to writing down and storing a written PIN, ‘C’ indicates clauses related to changing the PIN, ‘R’ indicates clauses related to reusing
it, and ‘A’ indicates clauses related to the destruction of the letter from the bank advising of the PIN. A  indicates that such a clause is present in the terms of ser-
vice, while a  indicates its absence.
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Code of Practice which states that customers should be told that
‘they should never write the PIN on the card . . .’ (ABS2), and
the Code of Consumer Banking Practice which states that ‘you
should . . . never write and/or keep record of your PIN together with
your card’ (ABS1).
Finally, a few banks do not provide guidelines to customers on
how PINs might be written down, such as the Bank of Palestine
(BPP1), Monte dei Paschi di Siena in Italy (MPS1), and the National
Bank of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (NBA1).
PIN change clauses
Half of the banks (15 out of 30) specifically indicate whether they
allow users to change their PIN, or provide advice on how to choose
a PIN. The rules varied across banks, with HSBC being concise, but
general:
These precautions include . . . not choosing security details that
may be easy to guess . . . (HUK1).
One bank (Nedbank in South Africa) requires customers to
change their PIN on receipt of a payment card, with no stated re-
strictions on PIN choice:
The client shall . . . immediately change any temporary PIN and
password allocated by the bank for the purpose of allowing the
client to access the services for the first time . . . (NSA2).
One other bank (Bank of Cyprus (BCC1)) mandates customer
PIN change, but also provides advice on how to select a PIN. The
Ahli United Bank in Bahrain (AUB1), and OCBC in Singapore
(OSi2), as well as the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS2) set
out requirements for selecting a strong PIN, telling users not to use
telephone numbers, birth dates, personally identifiable information,
or certain sequences of numbers as their PINs. For example:
The Customer may change the Customer’s ATM-PIN from time
to time. The Bank shall be entitled at the Bank’s absolute discre-
tion to reject any number selected by the Customer as the
Customer’s substitute ATM-PIN without giving any reason . . .
When selecting a substitute ATM-PIN, the Customer shall refrain
from selecting any series of consecutive or same or similar num-
bers or any series of numbers which may easily be ascertainable
or identifiable with the Customer . . . (OSi2).
It is odd to see such a requirement in a contract, as ATM systems
support a ‘denied PIN list’ and the bank could simply add PINs such
as 1234, 2345, . . ., 9999 to this list to block them completely, along
with commonly-blocked values such as 0000.
Seven other banks (Ahli United Bank (AUB1), Arab Bank
(ABJ2), Bank Audi (BAL1), Bank of Palestine (BPP1), Citibank
(CUS1), National Bank of Kuwait (NBKu2), and Zenith (ZBN1))
suggest their users change their PINs periodically. Finally, National
Bank of Greece states that the:
Bearer can replace [the PIN] with another number of his choice
at any of the Bank’s ATMs, following the on-screen instructions
. . . (NBG1).
Citibank tells its customers not to choose PINs that begin with a
zero:
The PIN you select must consist of four numbers and cannot
begin with a zero . . . (CUS1).
We have not been able to test whether this condition is enforced
by Citibank ATMs on their own customers. We also do not know if
the banks that do not set PIN-change conditions (including banks in
Algeria, Cyprus (Co-operative Central Bank), Denmark, Egypt,
Germany, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Malta, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE) offer a PIN change facility or not.
PIN reuse clauses
Even fewer banks provide advice on not reusing a PIN for multiple
cards—only five out of 30. For example, HSBC states that customer
precautions include ‘keeping your security details unique to your ac-
counts with us . . .’ (HUK1). This is actually in conflict with the ad-
vice given earlier by the UK banks’ trade association which
recommended customers to change all their PINs to the PIN issued
for one of their cards. The UK banks allow cardholders from any
bank to change their PIN at any bank-operated ATM.
Danske Bank allows customers to have a unique PIN sent to
them, or to use a PIN for a personal card that has already been
issued by the same bank (DBD1). The bank does not stipulate
whether the PIN has to be unique to them, and in any case it does
not appear to offer a PIN change facility. Arab Banking Corp. expli-
citly specifies that the PIN chosen has to be unique to the bank,
while Ahli United Bank only states that the PIN used must be
unique, under the heading ‘Security Information’ (AUB1).
PIN advice clauses
Seven banks stipulate that the original letter containing the PIN (the
PIN advice letter) must be destroyed. HSBC demands this ‘immedi-
ately after receipt’:
Safely destroying any Card PIN advice we send you immediately
after receipt, e.g., by shredding it . . . (HUK1).
In Cyprus (Co-operative Central Bank), Malta (APS Bank
Limited), and Qatar (Qatar National Bank), the banks allow cus-
tomers to memorize the PIN before destroying the advice:
Memorise the PIN and immediately destroy the document . . .
(CCB1).
Destroying the PIN notification sent to him by the Bank immedi-
ately after memorising the PIN . . . (APS2).
Upon receiving your credit/debit card, memorise the PIN and des-
troy the PIN mailer . . . (QNB1).
The customers of Danske Bank have no set time limit:
You must also remember to destroy the letter containing your
PIN (DBD1).
Clauses relating to bank statements and receipts
Fourteen of the 30 banks include clauses relating to bank statements
and/or receipts. Overall, these banks have notably differing require-
ments regarding the retention of bank statements and receipts. Only
HSBC in the UK and the National Bank of Kuwait insist that cus-
tomers shred their bank statements if they dispose of them:
Keeping card receipts and other information about your account
containing personal details (such as statements) safe and dispos-
ing of them safely. People who commit fraud use many methods
such as searching in dust bins to obtain this type of information.
You should take simple precautions, such as shredding paper
containing such information (HUK1).
Save receipts: Remember to take your receipts and shred them
before discarding. It is best not to ask for receipts at all (NBKu1).
The advice from the National Bank of Kuwait that receipts
should not be asked for differs from other banks, which require
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customers to retain receipts for reconciliation with bank statements
(AUB1, BAL1, BMO1). The Qatar National Bank specifically states:
Ensure that you received a copy of the receipt and keep it
safe . . . . Never throw away your transaction receipts (QNB1).
This requirement regarding the retention of records also differs
across banks. The Arab Bank in Jordan requires customers to ‘en-
sure that your account records are properly disposed’ (ABJ1), while
at the other extreme, the Arab Banking Corp. in Algeria recom-
mends that ‘the customer prints off and keeps or electronically saves
all electronic statements’ (ABC2). Three banks (Monte dei Paschi di
Siena (MPS1), Unicredit (UIt1) and National Bank of Kenya
(NBKe1)) provide vague statements, such as inviting their users to
apply ‘common sense’ when dealing with card transactions, or using
‘due care’.
Clauses relating to telephone banking security
Clauses relating to telephone banking security are found for 13 of
the 30 banks. Some are found in contracts specifically for telephone
banking; others are in general T&Cs; and yet others in a combin-
ation. Until July 2015, HSBC’s general UK contract set out require-
ments for safeguarding all credentials, including ‘PINs, security
numbers, passwords or other details including those which allow
you to use PIB [Personal Internet Banking] and TBS [Telephone
Banking Service]’ (HUK2). Further requirements for telephone
banking were found in a document called Banking Made Easy.
These documents were later revised; now, the T&Cs simply require
customers to follow the advice in the Banking Made Easy brochure.
Some requirements for PINs also apply here: credentials cannot be
written down in a way that can be understood by someone else, and
they must be unique to the bank. The security code for telephone
banking is a number of 6–10 digits created by the customer during
registration, so there is no advice letter to destroy.
The OCBC (OSi2) and Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS2) do not
specify whether telephone banking credentials may be written
down, or whether they have to be unique. However, customers are
permitted to change their telephone banking PIN. The OCBC speci-
fies that:
When selecting a substitute T-PIN, the Customer shall refrain
from selecting any series of consecutive or same or similar num-
bers of any series of numbers that may easily be ascertainable or
identifiable with the customer (OSi2).
Citibank customers can set up a ‘Telephone Personal
Identification Code (TPIC)’ by calling the bank (CUS1); the online
instructions do not discuss limits on code selection, or demand that
the TPIC be unique.
Many banks’ T&Cs for PINs also apply to telephone banking,
including that credentials should not be written in an ‘open place’
(ZBN1), should not be kept with the card for which they are to be
used (NBKe2), and should be changed periodically and be kept con-
fidential and private (ABJ3, BPP1, ABY2, NSA1).
Clauses relating to Internet banking security
As with telephone banking, some banks have specific contracts for
Internet banking, while others include this in general contracts.
Some go still further to impose conditions on the security of the net-
work, the security of the device including the use of security soft-
ware, and the use of online password managers or browsers to store
credentials.
The most onerous conditions are set out by HSBC in the UK.
Under its Personal Internet Banking T&Cs (HUK3), credentials for
Internet banking must not be written down in a way that can be
understood by someone else, they cannot be easy to guess, and they
have to be unique to the bank. The customer must always access
Internet banking by typing the address into the web browser and use
antivirus, antispyware and a personal firewall. If accessing Internet
banking from a computer connected to a LAN or a public Internet
access device or access point, they must first ensure that nobody else
can observe, copy or access their account. They cannot use any
third-party software, such as browsers or password managers, to re-
cord passwords or other security details. Finally, all security meas-
ures recommended by the manufacturer of the device being used to
access Internet banking must be followed, such as using a PIN or
biometric to lock a mobile device.
The OCBC, in Singapore, insists that the card and PIN must not
be kept together, yet elsewhere that PINs must be memorised and
not recorded anywhere. Customers were advised not to repeat any
digits in the 6-digit PIN more than once, that it should not be based
on the User ID, telephone number, birthday or other personal infor-
mation, that it should not be used for different websites, applica-
tions or services, and that it should be changed ‘regularly’.
Customers of the Singapore bank also have to install antivirus, anti-
spyware and firewalls, and ensure they were updated and patched.
File and printer sharing also have to be disabled, and customers can-
not use public or Internet cafe computers. Browsers cannot be used
to store credentials. What’s more:
10. Do not install software or run programs of unknown
origin . . .
14. Do not use a computer or device which cannot be trusted . . .
16. You are advised not to access Online Banking using ‘jailbro-
ken’ or ‘rooted’ mobile devices (ie the phone Operating System
has been tampered with), as it poses potential risk of malicious
software infection (OSi1).
The other banks reviewed do not impose such aggressive restric-
tions. Clauses specific to online banking include: using a firewall,
antivirus and/or antispyware software (AUB1, APS1, ABJ1, ABY2,
ABC1, BAL1, AMO2, CIB1, DBR1, DBG2, DSG2, NBA1, NBG1,
NBKu3, NCB2); using a modern browser (ABC1, MPS2); patching
the browser and/or operating system (AUB1, ABC1, BMO2, CIB1,
DVR1, DBG2, DSG2, NBA1, NBG1, NCB2); not saving passwords
in password managers or browsers (ABC2, BMO2, CIB1, NBA1,
NBKu3, NCB2); not using public access computers (AUB1, ABJ3,
ABY2, BMO2, CIB1, NBA1, NCB1, NCB2); encrypting wireless
networks (CIB1); clearing the cache after each banking session
(BMO2); using a password to access the computer (NCB2); and dis-
abling file and printer sharing capabilities (NCB2). The National
Bank of Kuwait and the Commercial International Bank in Egypt
refers to particular firewalls and antivirus programs:
Common commercial examples include Zone Labs, www.syman
tec.com and Computer Associates. The leading free firewall is
“Zone Alarm” from Zone Labs and there are many others to
choose from. Zone Alarm is now used on over 20, 000, 000 PCs
and has been awarded the PC World 2003 ‘World Class Award’
for Best Firewall (NBKu3).
There are many effective programs to choose from, but the most
common commercial products include McAfee, Symantec
(Norton) and Sophos. It is also possible to obtain free anti-virus
protection. A search for ‘free anti-virus’ on Google will provide a
list of the most popular (CIB1).
Danske Bank stipulates that customers should not leave the mo-
bile phone on which they receive codes and their payment card num-
ber with others, including members of their household (DBD2).
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Discussion
This review of bank T&Cs demonstrates that banks take a variety
of approaches to the security advice they offer to, and the demands
they make of, customers. The approach varies not just between juris-
dictions but between banks in each jurisdiction. Advice on writing
down PINs ranges from a strict ‘no’ to ‘yes, but’, with requirements
on obscuring the PIN and safekeeping. About half the banks allow
users to change PINs; but there’s a range of advice on PIN choice.
The PIN advice letter may have to be destroyed at once, or eventually,
or not at all; and a similar range of advice is given for bank statements
and receipts. The clauses regarding the safekeeping of authenticating
information for telephone banking and internet banking are no differ-
ent, except in that different banks take the different extreme positions.
Internet banking security is just as diverse, but much more complex;
there are many more kinds of advice that banks can and do give about
preventing malware infection of devices used for online banking,
many of which are outdated and difficult to follow.
While some of the advice is drafted so as to be helpful, many of
the instructions are demands. It is not clear from the present survey
which of these demands are also designed to minimize the risk to the
customer, and which are there to minimize the risk to the bank, by
enabling it to ask a whole series of hard questions of customers
who complain of fraud, and reject many claims on the basis of non-
compliance. Such behaviour will be discussed further in the final
‘Discussion’ section below. Surveying how banks in different
countries actually treat fraud victims and how this relates to local
banking regulation would be a fascinating research project, but a
very much larger one than the work reported here.
Limitations
There are number of limitations of our methodology that should be
mentioned. Primarily, our scope is limited to languages that our di-
verse range of authors speak. We did use search engines and site
maps when searching for T&C documents, so while care was taken
to retrieve the T&Cs documents of the banks studied, there were a
number of banks which did not seem to publicly list their T&Cs.
Furthermore, banks regularly update their T&Cs. Our research
here presents a snapshot. We have made our dataset publicly avail-
able (see the final ‘Discussion’ section), as outdated T&Cs can be
hard to retrieve.
In the following section, we explore how individuals interpret
and understand these differences.
Survey
The second contribution of this research is a cross-cultural study of
the understanding and interpretation of banking T&Cs. As we have
described in the previous section, there are significant differences in
the legal setting of banking between countries, as well as between
banks within the same country. However, these may appear rather
theoretical. In order to distill out the practical effects of the banks’
contracts, we conduct a survey with participants from Germany, the
UK and the USA. Consumer protection for fraudulent transactions
in Germany and the UK is governed by the same law, the EU
Payment Services Directive (PSD)1 (soon to be replaced by PSD22),
whereas USA disputes are governed by the more consumer-friendly
federal regulations E3 and Z.4 The PSD allows banks to refuse re-
funding a customer if the most likely explanation for the fraud is
considered to be that the customer was grossly negligent in comply-
ing with bank security rules. Regulations E and Z require that cus-
tomers be refunded in almost all circumstances, and demonstrating
gross negligence is not sufficient to refuse a refund. The aims of this
survey are three-fold:
1. identify the perceptions and prejudice of participants towards
banking T&Cs;
2. measure the ability of our participants to understand the banks’
T&Cs and act on them;
3. on a country-specific basis and as a cross-cultural study.
Related literature
While there are to our knowledge no cross-cultural examinations of
the understanding of T&Cs, many methodologies of cross-cultural
studies have been explored. Similarly, text comprehension is an es-
tablished research branch.
Cross-cultural study design
The field of psychology has devoted much research into conducting
valid cross-cultural studies. Jones and Kay lay out a number of chal-
lenges that cross-cultural research faces [15]. In this study we are
interested in the comparative use of the scores deduced from the re-
sponses from each of the countries, as we intend to perform analysis
on the differences between the groups. This requires us to aim for a
construct-referenced meaning across the different languages: the
study’s ‘aim’ needs to be translated to the cultures [16]. This is not a
purely translational issue: social norms and concepts may well be
different. Hence in our study we have opted for a symmetric transla-
tion: we have adjusted cultural symbols (as far as these are present
in contractual terms) to the best of the translator’s knowledge of the
target cultures.
The difficulty of conducting studies is not just limited to the
textual content. The steps on Likert scales may have different
meanings in different languages [17]. We have taken great care
that our study is accurately represented in the three cultures
studied, but a full sociological validity analysis is outside the scope
of this research.
Reading comprehension
There is an existing body of research on the comprehension of legal
texts. The initial research seems to have been carried out by Masson
and Waldron, who simplified T&Cs in three steps [18]. Each simpli-
fication increases comprehension, but absolute comprehension
values were still very low. Further studies on the topic point out
individuals do not read contracts before signing them [19], or do not
read Software Licensing Agreements before clicking OK [20].
Shorter End User License Agreements (EULAs) may actually
1 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending
Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and re-
pealing Directive 97/5/EC (Text with EEA relevance), available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri¼CELEX:32007L0064
(2 August 2017, date last accessed).
2 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market,
amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC
(Text with EEA relevance).
3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regecg.htm (2 August 2017,
date last accessed).
4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regzcg.htm (2 August 2017,
date last accessed).
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decrease number of software installations [21], as can politely ask-
ing for user permission [22]. Paraphrasing may well aid readability
[23], but just as in [18], absolute values of readability remain low.
These empirical findings are supported by one analytical study:
Prichard & Hayden analyse the EULAs of freeware using a number
of readability metrics [24]. They (perhaps unsurprisingly) support
the findings from the literature: the vast majority of EULAs were
very difficult to read and very long.
Survey design
The survey is divided into four stages. We begin with some demo-
graphics on the participants as well as some statistics on the pay-
ment methods our participants use. This is followed by two
scenarios on the conflicts between the T&Cs and customer. We
elicit the responses to the scenarios twice: before being aware of the
T&Cs and again afterwards. The scenarios are sourced from the UK
Financial Ombudsman newsletter [25–27]. The scenario texts pre-
sented below have not been changed in meaning from the Financial
Ombudsman newsletter. The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)
is an arbitration service that was set up by the UK banks as an alter-
native to using the court system to resolve disputes with customers,
and that now adjudicates according to their interpretation of the re-
quirements set out in the PSD. Arbitrations are binding on the bank,
and while a customer may instead take a case to the courts, the pro-
hibitive costs involved make this rare, so the FOS interpretation of
the PSD is dominant in the UK. Its quarterly newsletter publishes ex-
amples of its common dispute resolutions.
After asking a number of questions regarding the scenarios, we
introduce a set of T&Cs on payment safety and fraud (as discussed
in the previous ‘Discussion’ section on Page 116. We next ask the
participant a number of questions to gauge their understanding of
these T&Cs on a following page, without allowing them to page
back to access the terms.
We then reintroduce the two scenarios, this time giving them ac-
cess to the text of T&Cs, and again enquire about their expectation
of the outcome. The full survey text can be found at http://dx.doi.
org/10.14324/000.ds.1554770.
Most of the responses in the survey are collected using free-text
responses. There are several reasons for choosing this method. As
we are interested in the perceptions of the participants and their
understanding of the contract terms, we wanted to remove any form
of prompt in order to get unbiased responses. These free-text re-
sponses are then manually grouped using Thematic Analysis [28].
The raw counts are normalized, in most cases by the number of par-
ticipants per country. As each participant may have mentioned mul-
tiple themes, each theme may range between 0% and 100%.
The participants for this study were recruited using Prolific
Academic.5 The survey took on average 18 minutes to fill out, and
we paid each participant £2.50. We trialled the study on German,
British and American native speakers and ran an initial online pilot
that helped us resolve some minor ambiguities.
Conducting the survey in two languages across three countries
posed several challenges. Firstly, the financial legislation is very dif-
ferent between the EU and the USA (the USA being significantly
more consumer-friendly). This had a direct impact on the responses,
but we were nevertheless able to measure the impact of the treat-
ment of the T&Cs on the two scenarios. Secondly, there are signifi-
cant cultural differences regarding privacy and data protection
between the three countries.
The survey and the two scenarios were translated into German
by a native speaker, and checked by a second native speaker in order
to ensure that the intent of the questions was preserved as closely as
possible. Minor changes were also made between the British English
and American English version in order to aid comprehension.
The scenarios
Our two scenarios were presented in a random order to the partici-
pants. The order they were shown in did not lead to any statistically
significant variations in answers. The scenarios shown below are
those shown to the participants in the UK.
Scenario 1: Card loss
The first scenario is based on a typical story of theft [25]. The scen-
ario reads as follows:
Miss K travels to work on the Tube. When leaving the Tube at
the destination station, Miss K notices that her purse is missing.
In the Tube station is a police office, where she reports her purse
as stolen. When she gets to work, she phones her bank to cancel
her debit card. But, by this time, the thief has made several large
cash withdrawals using the card.
In the original article, the Financial Ombudsman decided that
the most likely reason the thief could withdraw cash is that Miss K
stored her PIN with the card. The Ombudsman concluded that Miss
K had likely been grossly negligent and is denied a refund. We do
not tell the participants this outcome.
Scenario 2: Phone scam
The second scenario is based on a combination of Ombudsman
News stories [26, 27]. The scenario reads as follows:
Mr L received a phone call from his bank. The person he spoke
to said there had been some ‘suspicious activity’ on his account,
and asked him if he had made certain purchases. When Mr L said
he hadn’t, the person on the phone said that he should call a dif-
ferent department at the bank straight away to sort the problem.
Mr L called the number on the back of his debit card. The person
he spoke to asked him some security questions and then con-
firmed that suspicious activity had taken place. They said that
Mr L should immediately transfer all the money from his account
to a different account, and he gave him the details of that account
over the phone. Mr L transferred the money straight away.
When Mr L told his partner what had happened, she was wor-
ried. She suggested he call his bank to check he’d done the right
thing. It turned out that Mr L had been the victim of a scam. The
fraudster had put a technical fix in place so that when Mr L
ended the first call and rang the number for his bank, he’d actu-
ally just reconnected with the fraudster.
In this scenario, the Ombudsman ruled that Mr L should not be
reimbursed, as he was deemed to have authorized the transaction.
The Financial Ombudsman chose the wording of the first line of the
scenario to intentionally highlight that the customer was unable to
verify the identity of the bank. There is a large number of similar
cases in the UK (although this type of fraud is less common in
Germany), which all vary slightly on the exact manner the fraudu-
lent transaction is processed. In some cases, the Ombudsman decides
in favour of the customer; in many others, she does not.
5 https://www.prolific.ac/ (2 August 2017, date last accessed)
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The T&Cs
It is infeasible to have our participants work through an entire docu-
ment of T&Cs as part of a study, as these documents range from 20
to 40 pages. In order to get a realistic assessment of the ability of
our participants, we avoided presenting only the passages most rele-
vant to the study, but left whole paragraphs intact. For the UK, we
chose HSBC’s General T&Cs (HUK2), and in particular section 9.
Important Security Information, and section 27.5 Liability for
Unauthorised Transactions. As discussed previously, HSBC’s T&Cs
are representative of T&Cs in the UK.
For the American participants, the survey focused on Citibank’s
Client Manual Consumer Accounts (CUS1). In particular, we chose
the sections on Lost or Stolen Banking Cards or Other Access Devices
and Unauthorised Electronic Transactions and Security Tips. Again,
our choice of the bank followed from our our previous analysis.
Following the same argument, we chose the T&Cs for Debit
Cards of Deutsche Bank (DBG1) for Germany. Here, we focused on
section 6. Geheimhaltung der perso¨nlichen Geheimzahl (PIN)
(Keeping your PIN secret), Section 12. Erstattungs- und
Schadensersatzanspru¨che des Kontoinhabers (Reimbursements and
claims for damages of the account owner), and Section 13. Haftung
des Kontoinhabers fu¨r nicht autorisierte Kartenverfu¨gungen
(Liability of the account owner for unauthorized card charges).
Demographics
We recruited 151 participants in total: 41, 56 and 54 participants
from the DE, UK and USA, respectively. An overview of the age and
gender of all recruited participants can be found in Fig. 1 and
Table 4. There are some surprising differences in these demographic
distributions between the three countries, considering that all par-
ticipants were sourced from the same platform. There is a strong
gender bias of around 3:1 in Germany and the USA. The partici-
pants in the UK are, however, gender-balanced.
Figure 1 highlights the age distributions between the participants
from the three countries. We checked the participants’ location by
geo-locating their IP address used to access the survey. IP geo-
location is far from accurate, however, all but 3 participants’ IP
addresses matched their declared country. We decided to include the
answers from these outliers, as the answers were well-written and
showed no other anomalies.
The mean ages across the three countries are 27.0, 33.7 and 30.4
years for the DE, UK and USA, respectively, with standard deviations
of 6.6, 12.7 and 9.8 years, respectively. In general, Prolific Academic
seems to have the most representative demographics for the UK.
There are distinct differences in employment across the USA, DE
and UK, as can been seen in Table 5. Almost all our participants
claim to be native speakers in our study; 100%, 92% and 92% for
the DE, UK and the USA, respectively. There is an above-average
distribution of educational statistics, which shows over 50% of our
participants from each of the countries have finished at least a bach-
elor’s degree or equivalent (see Table 6). The translation of educa-
tion levels is not straightforward, which may explain the 0% value
for GCSE level education in the USA. Two participants revealed that
they had learning disabilities.
It is obvious that our participants’ demographics could be better
aligned for a crosscultural study. Unfortunately, Prolific Academic
does not offer the functionality to sample participants to a specific
demographic distribution. However, while there are strong differ-
ences in the employment demographics (Table 5) and gender, par-
ticipants age and educational demographics (Figure 1 and Table 6)
are fortunately similar.
Payment demographics
In order to meaningfully compare the responses to our questions, we
have to check that the participants have similar levels of financial
development. One measure is the number of bank account and pay-
ment cards. Figure 2 shows three histograms for the number of pay-
ment cards our participants have in the DE, UK and the USA,
respectively. The means are here 2.0, 2.7 and 3.1, respectively.
Similarly, Figure 3 displays the distribution of bank accounts of our
participants with means 2.0, 2.5 and 1.8, respectively. While many
credit cards are prevalent in the USA, our participants there also
have the smallest number of bank accounts.
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Figure 1. Histogram of our participants’ age.
Table 4. Gender of our participants
Gender DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Female 24 52 27
Male 73 48 71
Other 2 0 2
Table 5. Employment demographics of our participants
Employment Status DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Employed 22 48 57
Student 63 30 14
Unemployed 2 4 12
Self-employed 7 13 16
Retired 2 6 0
Prefer not to say 2 0 0
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We also investigate the frequency of payment card use. Here, the
UK participants use their cards the most, followed by the
Americans. No participant in Germany uses a payment card on a
daily basis (Table 7), yet payment card penetration rates are still
high. Virtually, no participant manages a week on average without
using a card.
Fraud experience
We hypothesize that people who have been a victim of fraud previ-
ously are more likely to pay attention to the details of payment
contracts. We ask the participants if they have been fraud victims,
and to explain the experience to us if they have. In Table 8, we list
our participants’ frequency of fraud experience. In order to get as
complete description as we could, we solicited free-text responses.
We analysed these responses using Thematic Analysis, and the re-
sults can be seen in Table 9. The table is divided into three sections:
fraud identification, type of fraud, and resolution. As these were
manually annotated free-text responses, the absolute percentages are
approximate, but the relative differences are worth noting. There is a
clear trend in the stage where fraud is identified: in Germany, more
fraud is identified automatically than is noticed by the customers.
This is reversed for the UK and the USA, where almost two-thirds of
fraud is identified by the customer. For American customers, this
may be an annoyance, but a minor one: Federal Regulations E & Z
ensure that the customer will get his money back. In the UK, this
may be a greater worry as the refund is dependent on whether the
bank considers you to have been ‘grossly negligent’.
Scenario overview
In the following sections, the participants consider the two scenarios
in two different combinations: once before seeing the relevant
T&Cs, and once afterwards. Each time they are asked if they think
the protagonist should be reimbursed by the bank and why. The re-
sults of the binary question can be found in Table 10. We find that
in all but one case, the participants are more likely to have the pro-
tagonist reimbursed after reading the T&Cs. This is statistically sig-
nificant with p<0.05 for both scenarios using the McNemar’s test
for binary variables. We will now consider each of these four condi-
tions in isolation, and analyse the qualitative responses.
Table 6. Educational demographics of our participants
Highest qualification DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
GCSE Level education
(e.g., GCSE, O-Levels or Standards)
or lower
7 15 0
A-Level education
(e.g., A, AS, S-Levels, Highers)
24 11 12
Some undergraduate education
(e.g., No completed degree)
10 19 18
Degree/Graduate education
(e.g., BSc, BA)
32 35 43
Postgraduate education
(e.g., MSc, MA, MBA, PhD)
22 19 16
Vocational education
(e.g., NVQ, HNC, HND)
5 0 5
Other 0 2 4
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Figure 2. Participants’ number of payment cards.
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Figure 3. Participants’ number of bank accounts.
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Scenario 1: Card loss
For each of the two settings, there are two sets of answers to con-
sider: those that argue for the reimbursement of the protagonist, and
those against it.
Prior to revealing T&Cs
Tables 11 and 12 show the results of the ‘Card Loss’ scenario before
revealing the T&Cs. The respondents who supported reimburse-
ment gave a wide range of reasons (Table 11). The most recurring
reasons across the German, the UK and the USA surveys are: (i) the
theft was reported immediately, cited by 52.9%, 50.0% and 41.9%
of respondents respectively, and (ii) banks are expected to protect
their customers from fraud, with 35.3%, 38.6% and 48.8%.
Additionally, some of the UK respondents (4.5%) were more spe-
cific, and said that good security measures are deployed by banks to
defend against fraud. 17.6% of the German respondents said that
Miss K did not authorize the transaction and, hence, she should be
reimbursed; only 6.8% and 2.3% mentioned the same reason in the
UK and the USA surveys. Another interesting reason for reimbursing
Miss K is that it can be easily proven that she did not make the
transaction because CCTV cameras are widely deployed at ATMs;
this reason was mentioned in all three surveys. Only 2.3% of the UK
respondents believe that the insurance company is responsible for
compensating Miss K, whereas 14.0% provided the same reason in
the USA survey. Interestingly, only USA participants, with about 9%,
mentioned that reimbursement depends on Miss K’s bank T&Cs.
Table 12 presents the reasons provided by the respondents who
did not support the reimbursement across all three surveys. About
58% of the German respondents mentioned that Miss K waited too
long before reporting the incident to her bank; only 10.0% of the
UK respondents provided the same reason, whereas this reason was
not mentioned by any of the Americans. Some of the German
(29.2%) and the UK (10.0%) respondents believed she was grossly
negligent without explaining what ‘gross negligence’ means.
Another reason given is that it was her mistake because she forgot
her purse in the train; this reason was shared by many respondents,
namely 25.0% (DE), 20.0% (UK) and 30.8% (USA). Interestingly,
only 4.2% of the German respondents believed that a bank cus-
tomer is destined to lose, but a much higher percentage provided the
same reason in the UK (20.0%) and USA (23.1%) surveys. Also,
the same distribution was found for another reason: that once the
money leaves someone’s account, it cannot be retrieved. Another
interesting perception is that debit, as opposed to credit, cards are
not protected against fraud; this reason was given by 10.0% of
the English surveyed and 23% of the USA ones. Finally, 20.0% of
the Brits mentioned that since Miss K’s purse is not insured, the only
way to retrieve her money is to catch the thief (as if they simply
assumed that the bank would not bear the loss). About 4.0% did
not know (or were not sure about) whether Miss K should be reim-
bursed or not.
After revealing relevant T&Cs
After revealing the T&Cs to our participants, we were interested in
their comprehension. Table 13 presents the reasons provided by the
respondents who believed that Miss K should be reimbursed (after
reading the T&Cs). About 86% of the German respondents and
64% of the UK ones believed that the victim should get a refund be-
cause the card was stolen, and the transaction was unauthorized;
only 7% of the Americans provided this reason. On the other hand,
98.1% of the Americans mentioned that Miss K reported the inci-
dent within the time limits specified by the T&Cs; this reason was
given by 31.0% and 61.1% of Germans and Brits. No other reasons
were mentioned in the German survey. In contrast, 16.7% of UK re-
spondents believed that it can be proved that the card was stolen.
One of the Brits reported that Miss K used the land-line to report
the incident (2.8%). Another was unsure whether Miss K would be
reimbursed or not. One American said that insurance can actually
reimburse Miss K, and another believed it would be possible to
retrieve the money if the stolen card was a credit card, and not
a debit card.
Table 7. Frequency of use of any of our participants’ payment
cards
Frequency DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Every day 0 19 20
Several times a week 63 65 55
Once per week 22 13 20
Once per month 5 2 4
Several times per year 7 2 0
Once per year or less 0 0 2
Never 2 0 0
Table 8. Have you ever experienced fraudulent transactions or inci-
dents on any of your payment cards or bank accounts?
DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
No 88 72 66
Yes 12 28 34
Table 9. Thematic analysis of the description of frauds experienced
by participants. The first four codes describe the identification of
fraud, the next six codes describe the type of fraud, and the last
two describe the follow-up actions that happened
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Customer identifies fraud at a later stage 28.6 55.0 60.7
Transaction before card blocked 0.0 0.0 3.6
Transaction after card blocked 0.0 5.0 0.0
Transaction blocked by bank 42.9 30.0 21.4
Other/No idea where fraud occurred 42.9 30.0 42.9
Offline transaction 14.3 15.0 17.9
Online transaction 14.3 40.0 14.3
Cash withdrawal 0.0 0.0 7.1
Card stolen 0.0 5.0 7.1
Online account hacked 0.0 5.0 0.0
New card 28.6 30.0 32.1
Full refund 14.3 80.0 82.1
Table 10. Percentage of participants that say that the money should
be returned in each of the scenarios. McNemar’s test is significant
with p< 0.05 for both Scenario 1: Card Loss and Scenario 2: Phone
Scam
Question DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Scenario 1: Card Loss 41.5 81.5 76.8
Scenario 1: Card Loss after T&Cs 70.7 66.7 96.4
Scenario 2: Phone Scam 31.7 37.0 35.7
Scenario 2: Phone Scam after T&Cs 43.9 46.3 42.9
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In contrast, Table 14 displays the reasons mentioned by the par-
ticipants who said that Miss K should not be reimbursed, after see-
ing the T&Cs. Most Germans (83%) said Miss K was grossly
negligent because she lost her card and failed to cancel it swiftly.
The same reason was provided by 39% of Brits. In contrast, most
Brits (67%) believed that Miss K must have written her PIN down
on a piece of paper, and left that in her purse; only 17% of Germans
reasoned this way. All the Americans who opposed reimbursement
said that it is difficult to recover the money; only 11.1% of the Brits
gave this as their reason for refusing a refund.
Analysis
The arguments from both sides are interesting, considering that the
protagonist’s claim in the UK was denied due to the Ombudsman
deciding that the most likely explanation for the fraud was that she
had stored her PIN with her card and hence was grossly negligent.
Only 10% of the UK participants who argued against the protagon-
ist being reimbursed gave this reason. This changes drastically after
the participants have read the T&Cs: two-thirds of those who op-
pose reimbursement give the same reason as the Ombudsman.
We do not know how this case would have been decided in
Germany and the USA, but we can still analyse the change in percep-
tions. In the case of Germany and the UK, the percentages in favour
of reimbursement did not change with the revelation of the T&Cs.
In the USA, however, there was a significant shift to ‘She reported
the card stolen within the time limits’ from 41.9% to 98.1%. This
strongly suggests that our participants read the T&Cs carefully.
In contrast to the American T&Cs (‘sixty days after the state-
ment was mailed to you’), the German terms do not give a definite
time frame as to when a transaction has to be reported as fraudu-
lent. This may have motivated the high response rate in Table 14.
Scenario 2: Phone scam
Prior to revealing T&Cs
Table 15 presents the reasons provided by the participants who ini-
tially supported reimbursing Mr L in the ‘Phone Scam’ scenario. A
common theme across all three surveys is that banks should secure
their systems properly; this was the view of 53.8%, 50.0% and
55.0% of DE, the UK and the USA respondents. Secondly, banks
should be insured, should be ethical, and should be able to reverse
any unauthorized transaction; support was 30.8%, 35.0% and
25.0%. Thirdly, Mr L was tricked, but did the right thing by phon-
ing the number on the back of his debit card (30.8%, 35.0% and
15.0%). Additionally, 15.4% of the Germans said that as long as
fraud can be proven, Mr L should get his money back; this reason
was mentioned by 10% of Brits and Americans each. Only
Americans (with 10.0%) said that Mr L should be reimbursed be-
cause the scammer might have been a bank employee.
Table 16 shows the reasons given by the respondents who ini-
tially opposed reimbursing Mr L. Threequarters of Germans
believed that it was his fault because he fell for a scam; in contrast,
most Brits (64.7%) said that Mr L had most probably acted fraudu-
lently; this reason was given by one-third of the Americans but only
one-tenth of the Germans. Another one-third of the Americans said
that Mr L cannot be reimbursed because no one can differentiate be-
tween him and the scammer. Some other reasons were mentioned as
well across all surveys, such as bank accounts are generally not pro-
tected, banks do not tend to care about their customers, and it is
hard to recover the money.
Table 11. Thematic analysis of the answers in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 1: Card Loss
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Banks have good security that should
have prevented fraud
0.0 4.5 0.0
Depending on the T&C of the bank 0.0 0.0 9.3
Insurance will compensate her 0.0 2.3 14.0
People are protected from fraud by the
bank
35.3 38.6 48.8
She did not authorise the transaction 17.6 6.8 2.3
The theft was reported swiftly 52.9 50.0 41.9
Yes, because the bank can prove it
wasn’t her, due to CCTV at ATM
5.9 11.4 7.0
Table 12. Thematic analysis of the answers not in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 1: Card Loss
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Common perception that the customer
loses
4.2 20.0 23.1
Debit, as opposed to credit, cards do not
have fraud protection
0.0 10.0 23.1
Don’t know/unsure 4.2 0.0 0.0
Her mistake 25.0 20.0 30.8
Her purse is not insured, thief must be
caught
0.0 20.0 0.0
Money cannot be retrieved once it leaves
someone’s account
4.2 20.0 23.1
She may have been grossly negligent 29.2 10.0 0.0
She waited too long before notifying her
bank
58.3 10.0 0.0
Table 13. Thematic analysis of the answers in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 1: Card Loss, after the participants have
seen the T&Cs
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
However, it’s hard for debit, as opposed
to credit cards
0.0 0.0 1.9
Insurance will reimburse her 0.0 0.0 1.9
She reported the card stolen within the
time limits
31.0 61.1 98.1
She used the landline to report the
incident
0.0 2.8 0.0
The card was stolen, the transaction was
unauthorised, it’s fraud
86.2 63.9 7.4
Yes, if it can be proved that the card was
stolen
0.0 16.7 0.0
Table 14. Thematic analysis of the answers not in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 1: Card Loss, after the participants have
seen the T&Cs
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
It is difficult to recover the money 0.0 11.1 100.0
PIN might have been written down in
her purse
16.7 66.7 0.0
She was grossly negligent as she lost
her card and failed to immediately
cancel it
83.3 38.9 0.0
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After revealing relevant T&Cs
After revealing the relevant T&Cs, the respondents who supported
reimbursement provided the reasons shown in Table 17. 27.8% in
the DE survey said that Mr L would not have thought that a tech-
nical fix was in place; this reason was given by almost one-half of
the UK participants but only 8.3% of USA ones. Another 22% of
DE respondents said the Mr L followed the security procedures
documented for a phone call, a view shared by 28.0% and 4.2% in
the UK and USA surveys. Most of the USA respondents believed Mr
L should be reimbursed because he was not the one who authorized
the transaction, a view shared by only 16.7% of Germans, but
28.0% of Brits.
Finally, Table 18 documents the reasons for why Mr L should not
be reimbursed. About 60% and 50% in the DE and the UK surveys
believed that Mr L was grossly negligent; 28% of the USA partici-
pants who opposed reimbursement provided the same reason.
Another common reason is that Mr L transferred the money himself,
given by 35% (DE), 38% (UK) and 44% (USA). Other reasons
included that Mr L was the one who gave his details out to the fraud-
sters, that it is hard to recover the money, and that social engineering
attacks, such as phishing are not covered by the bank T&Cs.
Analysis
In the UK, the Ombudsman decided that the protagonist was not to
be reimbursed as he was deemed to have authorized the transaction
and has, hence, been grossly negligent. While the majority of partici-
pants from the UK shared the view that he should not be reimbursed
(Table 10), the majority of participants were unable to give the same
reason after reading the T&Cs, they only decided that he had been
grossly negligent. There was a significant shift in the opinion of the
German participants after reading the T&Cs: Previously the major-
ity had reasoned that ‘it was his own fault’, but this changed to the
vaguer but more consistent with the T&Cs view of ‘gross negli-
gence’ (Tables 16 and 18). Interestingly, even though ‘gross negli-
gence’ is not mentioned in the T&Cs shown to the American
customers, still 28.1% gave this reason (or one to that effect). But,
only in the USA did the majority of participants gave the same rea-
son as the Ombudsman—although it is uncertain if the decision
would have been the same in the USA.
Those participants that decided that the protagonist should be
reimbursed changed their reasoning significantly after reading the
T&Cs. In Germany and the UK, the previously most frequent re-
sponse—that the bank should have prevented the fraud (Table 15)—
does not appear as a reason in favour at all in Table 17. Instead, the
reason has shifted towards the fact that the customer acted with best
intentions, and could not have known that he had been reconnected
to the fraudsters after following the prescribed security procedure by
calling the number on the back of his card. While the participants in
the USA initially gave the same reasons as those from the UK and
Germany, after reading the T&Cs the vast majority (75.0%) agree
that the protagonist did not authorize the transactions. This must
have been a clear feature of the T&Cs presented to the participants
from the USA.
Understanding of T&Cs
The T&C documents are not easily accessible, and to be sure that
our participants actually spend some time reading them rather than
glossing them over, they were shown the terms on a separate page
and were instructed to read carefully because they would be asked
questions on these terms on the following page. Participants were
unable to return to the terms page once they had left. On average,
the participants spend 204 seconds on reading the T&Cs.
Table 15. Thematic analysis of the answers in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 2: Phone Scam
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Banks have good security that should
have prevented fraud
53.8 50.0 55.0
Don’t know/unsure 0.0 0.0 5.0
He was tricked into phoning the number
on the back of his card
30.8 35.0 15.0
If the fraud can be proven 15.4 10.0 10.0
The bank should be insured/reverse the
transaction/be ethical
30.8 35.0 25.0
The scammer can be someone working
in the bank
0.0 0.0 10.0
Table 16. Thematic analysis of the answers not in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 2: Phone Scam
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Banking accounts have no protection 7.1 11.8 16.7
Banks tend not to care about customers 3.6 8.8 5.6
Difficult to recover the money 7.1 5.9 16.7
Don’t know/unsure 0.0 0.0 2.8
His own fault, he was scammed 75.0 8.8 19.4
May have acted fraudulently 17.9 64.7 33.3
No one can tell the difference between
the fraudster and the real customer
0.0 17.6 30.6
Table 17. Thematic analysis of the answers in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 2: Phone Scam, after the participants have
seen the T&Cs
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Don’t know/unsure 16.7 0.0 4.2
He could not have been aware that there
was a technical fix in place
27.8 48.0 8.3
He followed the security procedures as
documented for telephone calls
22.2 28.0 4.2
He was not grossly negligent 22.2 20.0 0.0
If the fraud can be proven 0.0 4.0 0.0
It is not an authorized transaction 16.7 28.0 75.0
Phishing is not covered by the T&C 16.7 8.0 8.3
The bank can retrieve the money 0.0 4.0 4.2
Table 18. Thematic analysis of the answers not in support of reim-
bursement in Scenario 2: Phone Scam, after the participants have
seen the T&Cs
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Difficult to recover the money 8.7 3.4 12.5
Don’t know/unsure 4.3 0.0 3.1
He gave his details out on the phone to
the fraudsters
13.0 10.3 3.1
It is gross negligence 60.9 48.3 28.1
Mr. L transferred the money himself 34.8 37.9 43.8
Phishing not covered by the T&C 8.7 0.0 9.4
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A set of comprehension questions followed on the next page. It
seems that many of the participants had never read their bank’s
T&Cs before. One commented: ‘Why am I responsible for closing
the door to an ATM lobby as I leave? Why am I being told as a cus-
tomer to not let people into banks after hours?’
Each of the comprehension questions solicited a free-text an-
swer, and we subjected the responses to Thematic Analysis. In
Table 19, the participants analyse liability. The responses clearly
represent the peculiarities of the contracts: For American customers,
the only reason to get a non-fraudulent claim turned down is to miss
the deadlines. In contrast, in Germany and the UK, the focus is on
gross negligence, with 54% of participants from Germany correctly
stating that gross negligence is the reason for becoming liable.
Table 20 follows through by diving into the participants’ under-
standing of ‘gross negligence’. British and German participants agree
that ‘gross negligence’ is mostly about being careful with details,
where details may be any form of credentials or cards. Conversely,
the participants resident in the USA equate it with the more trad-
itional meaning of carelessness—clearly because their T&Cs do not
mention ‘gross negligence’ at all. The more legally correct version of
‘harmful misconduct’ is mentioned only infrequently.
Next, we asked how one was supposed to remember PINs
(Table 21). Writing down PINs is more accepted in the USA than in
Germany or the UK with over a quarter of participants stating that
the T&Cs allowed them to do so. Unfortunately, it was difficult
here to find sample T&Cs whose intentions were actually made
clear in the extract. Still further insights can be gained: there is a ten-
dency in the USA to change PINs frequently, something that was
only mentioned in the extract for the American participants.
Interestingly, PIN reuse is seen favourably in the UK with 32% of
participants noting it as acceptable—an even higher proportion than
we found in previous research [2]. We also note that Germans tend
to use memory techniques (36.6%) while Brits are more likely to
change their PIN to an existing or memorable number (31.5%). We
already noted that the UK banks’ association encourages PIN
changes, and all banks provide the facility. However, some banks in
Germany do not allow customers to change their PINs at all.
In contrast to these tables, we asked the participants to self-judge
their own understanding of the T&Cs. Table 22 shows that the vast
majority of participants claimed to understand the majority of the
terms although less than a quarter of participants from Germany
claimed to understand them fully. Given that our participant pool
has above average education, it is likely that most bank customers
do not fully understand the contract terms of their bank accounts.
However, it should be noted that the subject pool from the USA
thought they understood their terms to a much greater extent (al-
though they are about equally well-educated). Perhaps the better
consumer protection makes them less cautious. It is also noteworthy
that after reading the T&Cs, participants actually realised that they
had even stronger rights than they thought.
Diving into more detail, Table 23 lists the broad themes that the
participants were struggling with. What most stands out is that in
Germany the T&Cs were branded as unclear, needlessly compli-
cated and full of special terms and abbreviations. One participant
noted: ‘Everything is overcomplicated. The terms actively avoid
using clear, simple language.’ We concur; German T&Cs do actu-
ally appear much more difficult to understand than the UK’s.
Table 19. Thematic analysis of the answers to the comprehension
question: ‘When are you liable for an unauthorised transaction?’
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Don’t know 2.4 7.4 7.1
Notified not quickly enough 19.5 13.0 80.4
Shared details 7.3 27.8 3.6
Violate T&Cs 7.3 18.5 1.8
Fraudulently 0.0 16.7 0.0
Always 7.3 5.6 3.6
If you notice something suspicious 0.0 0.0 1.8
Not kept details safe 19.5 9.3 3.6
Been phished 2.4 1.9 0.0
Gross negligence 53.7 27.8 0.0
Table 20. Thematic analysis of the answers to the question: ‘What
is gross negligence?’
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Don’t know 4.9 3.7 12.5
Carelessness 4.9 31.5 46.4
Not being careful with details 53.7 48.1 8.9
Your fault 2.4 11.1 5.4
Ignoring warnings 2.4 1.9 0.0
Not informing your bank of loss 7.3 14.8 14.3
Negligence beyond reasonable practice 17.1 9.3 10.7
Harmful misconduct 7.3 0.0 3.6
Not following the T&Cs 7.3 5.6 0.0
Table 23. Thematic analysis of understanding issues of the T&Cs of
the participants
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Tips useful 0.0 0.0 1.8
All ok 36.6 51.9 73.2
Complicated 29.3 13.0 17.9
Unclear 51.2 13.0 19.6
Abbreviations, special terms 24.4 25.9 1.8
Gross negligence 0.0 13.0 0.0
Negligence limits unclear 0.0 0.0 5.4
Table 22. How confident are you that you have understood the
T&Cs?
Level DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Understood nothing 0 0 0
Understood the minority 7 6 2
Understood half of it 12 2 4
Understood the majority 59 54 50
Understood everything 22 39 45
Table 21. Thematic analysis of the answers to the question: ‘What
can you do to remember your PIN?’
Code DE (%) UK (%) USA (%)
Write down 17.1 11.1 26.8
Change periodically 0.0 0.0 21.4
Memory technique 36.6 14.8 16.1
Use existing/memorable numbers 9.8 31.5 14.3
Choose unique 4.9 1.9 0.0
Just remember it 26.8 27.8 25.0
Write down encrypted 4.9 3.7 1.8
Don’t know 7.3 11.1 5.4
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Discussion
Fifteen years ago, when online banking was in its infancy, many
banks sought to shift liability explicitly by making customers liable
for any transaction where they said the customer’s password was
used. This led to complaints about liability shifting. The situation
now is for banks to give instead a variety of different advice, much
of it so vague that it is unclear how customers are to set about com-
plying with it, or indeed whether their behaviour is likely to be
changed by it at all. In some cases, advice given by banking trade as-
sociations is contradicted by member banks’ small print. In the case
of the most aggressive banks (in the UK and Singapore), it is prob-
ably infeasible for customers to comply with the stated contract terms,
and later work will test this on a panel of representative users.
Customers disputing transactions frequently contact the authors
to discuss their case. We find that a common approach of the bank
is to request that the customer answers a checklist of whether they
complied with security recommendations taken from the bank
T&Cs. This advice includes recommendations that never appear in
bank publicity, and even contradict advice from banking trade
bodies, and so the checklist will likely be the first time the customer
has ever seen the recommendations. This creates a climate of expect-
ation in which a court or Ombudsman will be tempted to run
through the checklist, in effect asking the customer to prove they
were not careless. This also explains a possible reason for banks to
list some security recommendations only in T&Cs that they know
the vast majority of their customers will not read. But, rather than a
blanket assertion to this effect, the actual argument for refusing a re-
fund will usually be one based on the facts of the case where the
bank says ‘Your password was used so you must have been negli-
gent.’ In the USA, where consumer laws are held to discourage such
an argument, the bank can argue instead ‘As your password was
used, you authorized this transaction’ [29]. The exceedingly onerous
UK bank T&Cs are particularly worrisome in this context.
The initial draft of the PSD would have restricted the UK and
other EU banks from using their T&Cs in this way, as the bank
would be required to find additional evidence of negligence, in add-
ition to their own records showing that the transaction was per-
formed with a payment instrument they issued (such as a card).
During the development of the PSD, we know from banking indus-
try submissions [30] and our discussions with the individuals
involved in the drafting process, that industry lobbied to continue to
be permitted to treat their own records as authoritative statements
showing that customers are liable for disputed transaction. The
banking industry proved successful in doing so by amending Article
59(2) to insert the word ‘necessarily’ and so, in the view of regula-
tors enforcing the PSD who the authors met with, nullifying the ori-
ginal version’s effect. The final version of the PSD Article 59(2),
substantially replicated in PSD2 Article 72, reads ‘Where a payment
service user denies having authorised an executed payment transac-
tion, the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment ser-
vice provider shall in itself not necessarily be sufficient to prove
either that the payment transaction was authorised by the payer or
that the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negli-
gence to fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56’ (em-
phasis ours). The PSD2 does add the requirement that ‘The payment
service provider, including, where appropriate, the payment initi-
ation service provider, shall provide supporting evidence to prove
fraud or gross negligence on part of the payment service user.’ Banks
may however may continue to decide that their records showing
that a transaction was authorized are such sufficient supporting
evidence.
Most developed countries have unfair-contract laws, so the ques-
tion to ask may be: ‘are bank contracts fair?’ Our initial investiga-
tion shows that in many cases they are too vague for a firm view to
be taken one way or another, and so an assessment will come down
to a study of actual dispute resolution practice. However, where
contract terms require user behaviour that is far from normal, a us-
ability assessment may provide an answer; and where a banking as-
sociation advises customers to change all their cards to the same
PIN, while some of its member banks have small print forbidding
the practice, that is clearly unfair. The unfairness that results from
obfuscation does vary, however. Americans tend to be reassured
when they actually read their bank contract T&Cs, while most
Germans find them too hard to understand. Overall, the data we
have collected gives a number of insights into the effects that the dif-
fering approaches to bank regulation have had on consumer expect-
ations between countries. There is much more work to be done here,
by researchers and regulators alike.
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